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The Early Franciscan Doctrine of Divine Immensity: 
Towards a Middle Way Between Classical Theism and Panentheism 
 
This contribution is dedicated to Paul Fiddes. 
 
ABSTRACT: Since Augustine, Western medieval thinkers have largely identified 
‘simplicity’ as the most fundamental feature of the divine nature. Although the Western 
tradition of thinking about God has often been regarded as relatively continuous, I will 
demonstrate in this paper that a separate line of thought developed amongst early 
thirteenth-century Franciscan thinkers. This new tradition stressed God’s immensity or 
infinity. In doing so, I will argue, it instigated a fundamental shift in the way of 
conceiving the nature of God that holds profound promise for reconciling factions in 
systematic theology today, particularly between Classical Theists and Panentheists.   
 
KEYWORDS: Classical Theism, Panentheism, Franciscan, Divine Immensity, Divine 
Simplicity, Divine Infinity 
 
Since Augustine, medieval thinkers in the West have largely identified ‘simplicity’ 
as the most fundamental feature of the divine nature. Indeed, the doctrine of divine 
simplicity—now frequently referred to as ‘classical theism’—has been propounded by 
such noteworthy scholars as Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, 
who articulated this doctrine in its mature form. Although the Western tradition of 
thinking about the general nature of God has often been regarded as relatively continuous, 
I will demonstrate in this paper that a second and separate line of theological thought 
developed amongst the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition, who worked in 
the first half of the thirteenth century.  
Where the preceding tradition emphasized the basic simplicity of the divine, this 
new tradition stressed God’s immensity or infinity. In doing so, I will argue, it instigated 
a fundamental shift in the way of conceiving the nature of God that holds promise for 
reconciling factions in systematic theology today, especially between Classical Theists 
and so-called Panentheists. In order to substantiate this claim, I will start by offering an 
overview of the unique structure of the early Franciscan doctrine of God and its possible 
historical sources. This analysis will highlight the respects in which early Franciscan 
theologians appear to have departed from or developed past precedent in treating the 
nature of God.  
In a second part of the paper, I will briefly outline the traditional teaching on 
divine simplicity, as advocated by Augustine, by way of a foil that will throw into relief 
the innovativeness of the early Franciscan doctrine of divine immensity, which I will then 
treat in more detail. In the third part, I will defend the suggestion that the early Franciscan 
doctrine of God as immense holds significant promise for reconciling the concerns of 
contemporary Classical Theists and Panentheists.  
My source for this discussion is the so-called Summa Halensis, a collaborative 
work on the part of the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition—most notably 
Alexander of Hales, who oversaw the project, and for whom it is named. Although the 
Summa was mostly completed between 1236-1245, twenty years before Aquinas set his 
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hand to the task of authoring his magisterial Summa Theologiae, final sections of the text 
may have been written as late as 1256, possibly even by the likes of Bonaventure.  
Until recently, the Summa Halensis has been very little studied, for a number of 
possible reasons. One has to do with questions surrounding its authorship. Although the 
editors of the third volume of the Summa corrected the longstanding assumption that the 
entire work was composed by Alexander of Hales himself, and made significant progress 
in identifying the likely authors of different sections of the text, it is still difficult 
decisively to determine who wrote what in the Summa.1 This difficulty has deterred 
scholars from appreciating the Summa for what it was seemingly meant to be, to wit, an 
indicator of the collective mind of the early Franciscan school.     
Another reason for the Summa’s neglect has to do with the notion, espoused by 
generations of medievalists, including the initial editors of the Summa, that the text 
served primarily to systematize the longstanding intellectual tradition of Augustine at the 
beginning of a period in which Aristotle’s works were rapidly rising in popularity.2 One 
motive for my discussion here is to query this assumption and to show that the Summa 
Halensis and the early Franciscan tradition of thought more generally is highly 
sophisticated and multi-dimensional. In this connection, I will demonstrate further below 
that the Summa represents, first and foremost, an effort on the part of early Franciscans to 
lay down a Franciscan intellectual tradition for the very first time.  
In other words, it seeks to translate the spiritual and ministerial vision of Francis 
of Assisi into philosophical and theological principles that provided a basis at the time for 
Franciscan education and especially for participation in the larger University context, 
which was quickly becoming the touchstone of all spiritual and intellectual credibility.3 
On these grounds, I submit that Franciscan doctrines—such as divine immensity—must 
be interpreted against the backdrop of the early writings by and about Francis, which 
served as the principle by which early Franciscan scholars selected and deployed 
authorities. This is the sort of interpretation I will offer in what follows, after treating the 
structure and sources of the Summa’s treatise on the one God. 
 
The Structure of the Summa’s Doctrine of God and its Sources 
 
The treatise on the One God in the Summa Halensis consists of six tractates. The 
first covers the necessity or essentiality, immutability, and simplicity of the divine—in a 
mere 13 pages; the second deals with divine immensity in nearly 60 pages; the third 
covers the unity, truth, and goodness of God in almost 100 pages; the fourth, fifth, and 
sixth sections deal with God’s power, knowledge, and will, respectively, in 
approximately 200 further pages. The coverage of some of these topics, such as divine 
immutability and simplicity as well as divine power, knowledge, and will, is relatively 
                                                        
1 See Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa’, 
Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947), 26‒41, 274‒312. 
2 See the Prolegomena to Alexander of Hales, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales 
Ordinis minorum Summa theologica, 5 vols (Florence: Quaracchi, 1924–48), section IV: 
Patres Latini.  
3 Neslihan Senocak, The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan 
Order 1209-1310 (Ithaca: Cornell, 2012). 
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unremarkable. These topics are dealt with in Lombard’s Sentences.4 Moreover, they are 
treated albeit in more disparate fashion in the works of Augustine and Anselm, not to 
mention Aquinas.  
 More extraordinary is the primacy given to divine necessity and the amount of 
space devoted to the discussion of divine immensity and to the so-called ‘transcendentals’ 
of unity, truth, and goodness. While it would be very interesting to explore the early 
Franciscan arguments concerning divine necessity and the transcendentals—which seem 
to come to them through the work of the Arab scholar Avicenna—this would take me far 
beyond the scope of my current project.5 Thus, the focus of this paper will remain on 
matters directly related to divine immensity. 
A search through the volumes of the Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, and of 
the Patrologia Latina, reveals only scant and relatively unremarkable references to divine 
immensity prior to the twelfth century. Isidore of Seville seems to be our best source for a 
definition of the doctrine. On his account:6  
 
The immensity of the divine greatness is such that we understand him to be inside 
everything, but not enclosed [in it]; outside everything, but not excluded [from it]. 
Insofar as he is inside, he contains everything; insofar as he is outside, he contains 
all things by the uncircumscribed immensity of his magnitude. Thus, it is shown 
that insofar as he is outside, he is creator. But in so far as he is inside, it is proved 
that he governs everything. And in order that none of the things that are created 
are without God, he is inside everything. Truly, in order that they are not outside 
God, God is outside so that he contains everything. 
 
As the quotation above suggests, the doctrine of divine immensity provided a way 
for early medieval scholars like Isidore to affirm the simultaneous immanence and 
transcendence of God. While this proximity-in-distinctness was perhaps one logical 
outworking of the doctrine of God as simple for such scholars, it was arguably just one of 
any number of other attributes that could be derived from that doctrine. In short, it was 
not necessarily central. This situation appears to change in the twelfth century as a result 
of the popularization of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius by Hugh of St Victor. 
                                                        
4 Peter Lombard, Sentences, vol. 1: simplicity (distinction 8); God’s knowledge 
(distinction 35); God’s omnipotence (distinction 42-4); the will of God (distinction 45-8). 
5 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham 
Young University Press, 2005). Meldon C. Wass draws attention to the Avicennian 
influence on the Summa in his, The Infinite God and the ‘Summa fratris Alexandri’ 
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1964). 
6 Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, Book I, ch 2, 3: Immensitas divinae magnitudinis ita est, 
ut intelligamus eum intra omnia, sed non inclusum; extra omnia, sed non exclusum. Et 
ideo interiorem, ut omnia contineat; ideo exteriorem, ut incircumscripta magnitudinis 
suae immensitate omnia concludat. Per id ergo, quod exterior est, ostenditur esse 
creator; per id vero quod interior, gubernare omnia demonstratur. Ac ne ea quae creata 
sunt sine Deo essent, Deus intra omnia est. Verum ne extra Deum essent, Deus exterior 
est, ut omnia concludantur. (There are 8 references to divine immensity in total in this 
work). 
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Frequently throughout his corpus, Dionysius refers to the immensurabilitas of 
God. In his commentary on Dionysius’ Celestial Hierarchy, Hugh picks up on this and 
translates it into comments on divine immensitas. While the doctrine is not the main 
focus of Hugh’s theology, it seems to enter through him, among others, onto the 
theological scene, recurring in a number of Hugh’s other works, including his great De 
sacramentis fidei.  
The slightly later popularization of John of Damascus’ De fide orthodoxa by Peter 
Lombard may also have contributed to the rising trend to refer to God in terms of his 
immensity. After all, John makes frequent reference to divine infinity, an attribute that 
was often employed interchangeably with immensity.7 Although the Lombard himself 
introduced Damascus’ work cautiously and somewhat defensively, knowing the Greek 
Father’s authority might be questioned in the West, early Franciscan authors lived at a 
time when such timidity had ceased to pose a major hindrance to appropriation. In that 
sense, the new emphasis in the West on divine immensity or infinity might be attributed 
at least in part to the reception of Greek theological and even philosophical influences. 
The initial introduction of immensity by these means evidently proved a 
considerable inspiration to Hugh’s successor, Richard of St Victor. In his De Trinitate, 
Richard bemoans the fact that he finds in the Western tradition no fully satisfying, purely 
rational explanation as to how God can be both one and three, even though he finds that 
the Tri-unity of God is constantly affirmed on authoritative grounds. As a result, Richard 
sets out to provide such an explanation, which he subsequently works out entirely in 
terms that can be accessed by reason.8 In this regard, he initially seeks to defend the claim 
that God is one.9 Here, the doctrine of divine immensity quickly comes to the fore of his 
discussion, albeit in the wake of an argument for the necessary existence of only one God.  
In order to support his claims on this score, Richard postulates three possible 
modes of being, seemingly drawn from the work of John Scotus Eriugena, whose interest 
in Greek thought is well known, and whose translation of the Dionysian corpus would 
have been the one of several available translations which Richard would likely have 
consulted.10 These modes of being are: from eternity and deriving its existence from 
itself; neither from eternity nor from itself; or from eternity but not from itself. According 
to Richard, a fourth possibility—the opposite of this last one—is impossible, because 
there cannot be any being that is not from eternity but which is nevertheless from itself, 
lest there have been a time when nothing existed that could have given rise to the 
existence of other things.  
In Richard’s account, two such non-identical beings cannot exist, otherwise one 
would be superior to the other, and would not therefore be the most powerful being.11 On 
                                                        
7 Jacques-Guy Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and the Sentences of Peter Lombard’, in 
The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 
113-64, esp. 133-7.  
8 Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate (DT), in Patrologia Latina, vol. 196, ed. J.P. Migne 
(Paris, 1855), III.I, p. 115. Page numbers taken from the translation by Ruben Angelici. 
Richard of St Victor: On the Trinity (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2011).  
9 DT, I.V, 76. 
10 DT, I.VIII, 79; cf. John Scotus Eriugena, Divisione I.1, 441b. 
11 DT, I.XIV, 83. 
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the basis of this four-fold distinction, consequently, Richard concludes that a single, 
supreme being, both eternal and from itself, necessarily exists. To bolster this conclusion, 
he invokes Anselm’s famous argument and thereby appropriates it for the purposes of 
defending divine necessity, in a way the Franciscans take up in their own discussion of 
this matter.12  
In this context, Richard further contends that since God is infinite in terms of his 
eternity, he must also be infinite as regards his greatness.13 That is to say, he is 
immense—there is no measure to his goodness, which cannot be comprehended. As such 
a being, God is immutable: he cannot deteriorate or improve, since his greatness is 
unsurpassable.14 Once again, Richard insists, there can only be one immense being, 
otherwise there would be multiple beings that cannot be comprehended by others, such 
that each would be superior to the others, which entails a contradiction.15  
Such a supreme being cannot lack any desirable attributes: his definition is to be 
all that is good.16 In that sense, Richard follows a longstanding tradition, upheld by 
Anselm, which posits a unity of God’s essence and his attributes.17 According to this 
tradition, God is or is the definition of the properties he has—he has them in their 
fullness—whereas creatures simply have those properties in limited or qualified ways. 
God is whatever it is best to be. As such, he is one thing, and simple, not subject to the 
complex components or alterations that characterize his creatures.18  
While Richard thus concludes his discussion with a brief nod towards the doctrine 
of divine simplicity, that feature is mentioned only after much more attention has been 
given to the immensity of God. In Richard’s work, therefore, we witness the beginning of 
a shift in the doctrine of God, whereby simplicity and many other features are subjected 
to immensity rather than the other way around—a trend which the Franciscans would 
pick up and popularize in their own way. This brings us to a discussion of the Franciscan 
doctrine itself, which I will contrast in the first instance with the traditional doctrine of 
divine simplicity, as articulated by Augustine. 
 
The Summa Halensis on Divine Immensity 
 
In his De Trinitate, Augustine explains the doctrine of divine simplicity by 
offering examples of things that are not simple.19 As he notes, bodily substances are not 
simple because they are comprised of parts which are subject to accidental changes, that 
is, changes in the properties of shape, color, etc. In his view, even the human soul is 
composed of parts in the sense that it is present throughout the body, while not located at 
any one place in the body, and it is subject to changes in thoughts or feelings.  
                                                        
12 DT, I.XI, 81. 
13 DT, II.V, 95. 
14 DT, II.III, 93. 
15 DT, II.VI, 95. 
16 DT, II.XVI, 104. 
17 DT, II.XVIII, 105. 
18 DT, II.XX, 107. 
19 DT, VI.6. 209-10.  
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By contrast to embodied beings, God is incorporeal and thus invisible. As such, 
he is not composed of parts.20 For the same reason, he is not changeable, given that 
change implies an alteration in the accidents or properties that are attributed to a 
substance or entity and a corresponding adjustment in the shape or size of its component 
parts. Thus, he cannot become wiser or more merciful, or become just where he 
previously was not. In fact, all of the properties that can be associated with him are not 
attributed to him as accidents, which are subject to alteration, but to his substance. As 
many medieval authors following Augustine famously quipped, ‘God is what he has: his 
essence is his accidents’.21 This means that God is whatever it is best to be, and is always 
completely so. To sum up: God always completely is what he is, which is the essence and 
source of all that is good.  
As noted already, the Franciscan Summa treats the idea of divine simplicity, albeit 
in a mere four pages, in a section on the essentiality or necessity, immutability, and 
simplicity of God. Although the placement of this discussion just prior to that of divine 
immensity does suggest a certain deference to longstanding tradition, the Summist’s 
approach to the question of simplicity represents quite an unusual theological departure. 
His account focuses on a conceivable threat to the possibility of a simple God, namely, 
the Christian assertion that God subsists in multiple persons, which could be taken to 
imply that God is composed of parts and therefore fails to count as simple.22 
With this threat in view, the Summist insists that the three persons in God do not 
undermine divine simplicity, because they do not represent diverse substances but rather 
diverse modes of relation in God, which actually enact his simplicity. In supporting this 
contention, the Summist appeals to Richard of St Victor—a key authority for early 
Franciscan Trinitarian theology. In his De Trinitate, Richard argued that a plurality of 
persons does not detract from the unity of the divine nature, just as a plurality of 
substances—specifically, body and soul—does not detract from the unity of a human 
person.23 Thus, we see that for early Franciscans, the doctrine of divine simplicity is not a 
statement about the fundamental nature of God but a ground-clearing exercise, whereby 
they illustrated that their belief in the Trinity can be reconciled with the unity of God.  
When it comes to determining the most basic attribute of this one God, however, 
the early Franciscans turn—straightaway from the discussion of simplicity—to elaborate 
on the immensity of God, in a treatise that runs nearly sixty pages. For all practical 
purposes, consequently, they appear to have substituted immensity for simplicity as the 
defining feature of the one God. Thus, it remains to consider what the founding fathers of 
the Franciscan school have to say about the immense nature of the divine.  
Their treatment of this topic is divided into four main parts, which pertain to the 
immensity of God in his own being, which is defined in terms of divine infinity; in 
relation to the human mind, which concerns divine incomprehensibility; in terms of his 
location, which pertains to his incircumscribability; and in relation to time, or God’s 
                                                        
20 DT, V.1-2, 171-3. 
21 DT, VI.7, 210-11. 
22 Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)  
(Florence: Quaracchi, 1924), Tr 1, Qu 3, Ch 1, Ad 2, p. 50. All references taken from 
volume 1 unless otherwise stated. All translations mine. 
23 SH, Tr 1, Qu 3, Ch 2, Respondeo, 52. 
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eternity. With the exception of divine eternity, which would take us rather beyond the 
scope of the present discussion, I will survey these parts below before offering an 
analysis of them. 
 
Divine Infinity 
The first chapter of the first part of this discussion inquires whether the divine 
essence is infinite or finite.24 In favour of the idea that God is finite, the Summist 
marshals a number of arguments, for example, that the terms ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ imply 
quantity. On the grounds of Augustine’s claim that God does not have quantity, the 
Summist insists that he cannot be either finite or infinite.25 Furthermore, the Summist 
notes along the lines of Aristotle that finitude implies completion or ‘being finished’, and 
in that sense, God must be ‘most finite’. Finally, he observes, finite things better lead to 
the knowledge of God than infinite things, such that God must be finite.26  
 In working towards a solution to the question at hand, the Summist quotes a 
passage from Pseudo-Dionysius, which states that we should not try to say anything 
about God that is not in the Scriptures.27 As the Scriptures do not define God as finite, the 
Summist thus concedes, we should say that he is infinite, unless we want to say that he is 
finite in the sense of being complete. To support this contention, he invokes John of 
Damascus, who argues that God is incircumscribable, uncreated, and infinite.28 With the 
support of these two central Greek authorities, therefore, the Franciscans exchange 
infinity for simplicity as the fundamental feature of God. 
 
Divine Incomprehensibility 
The next question treats the immensity of God with respect to the intellect, that is, 
his incomprehensibility. In answering the question whether God is comprehensible or 
incomprehensible, the Summist states that there can be a comprehensive cognition of the 
intellect, insofar as it adheres to the truth, or a comprehensive cognition of the intellect, 
which encompasses the object known.29 In the first way, God is comprehensible, because 
the intellect must adhere to the First Truth, which is God, in order to know anything at all, 
as I will explain further below. This comprehension is nothing but a certain type of 
                                                        
24 SH, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, 54-7.  
25 Augustine, De quantitate animae 3. 
26 SH, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, Ad 1, 2, 4, 5, p54-5. 
27 SH, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, Solutio, 56; cf. Psuedo-Dionysius, The Divine Names I.1: 
universaliter non audendum dicere aliquid de insuperabili et occulta divinitate, quam ea 
quae nobis divinitus ex sacris Eloquiis claruerint. 
28 John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa 1.8: deus est incircumscriptus, increatus, 
infinitus. 
29 SH, Tr 2, Qu 2, Ch 1, Respondeo, 59-60: dicendum quod potest appelari comprehensio 
cognitio intellectus apprehendentis sive adhaerentis veritati, vel potest appelari 
comprehensio cognitio intellectus includentis. Sumendo comprehensionem primo modo, 
dicendum quod Deus est comprehensibilis, quia intellectus noster adhaeret veritati quae 
Deus est…Et haec comprehensio nihil aliud est quam quaedam apprehensio….Si dicatur 
comprehensio cognitio intellectus includentis…hoc modo impossibile est Deum 
comprehendi, quia impossibile est quod intellectus includat divinam essentiam. 
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apprehension. On the authority of Augustine, however, the Summist insists that the mind 
cannot comprehend God in the sense of seeing him in full, for he cannot be circumscribed 
by the intellect in this life.30 
 
Divine Incircumscribability 
The third section and final section I will consider in this context treats God’s 
immensity with respect to location, that is, his incircumscribability. In the first instance, 
the Summist establishes that God is the only being that can be properly defined as 
incircumscribable—not bound, as John of Damascus says, by place or time or 
understanding.31 After all, he is the creator even of other purely spiritual or 
inscircumscribable beings, such as angels.32 
 In this light, the Summist next explores the question as to where God can be 
found. Is he anywhere? Everywhere? Nowhere? In response to these questions, he 
distinguishes between two ways of being in a place, namely, by definition, as a spirit or 
quality can be said to fill a place without respect to spatial dimensions, or physically, as a 
body fills a place. While God is not located in the latter respect, he is locatable in the 
former sense, in much the same way—as Augustine says—that wisdom fills the wise, 
such that the wise conversely participate in wisdom.33 When he is conceived along these 
lines, God is nowhere—or not anywhere in specific—because he is everywhere, not so 
much in the sense that he is in all places, albeit spiritually, but insofar as all places 
virtually exist in him.34 For this reason, it is possible simultaneously to say that God is 
everywhere and yet to assert that his presence to other places does not take him outside 
himself, indeed, that God is in himself.35  
Following on from this discussion is a section of the existence of God in things 
(existentia Dei in rebus).36 This section treats the way in which God is ‘inside and not 
included, outside and not excluded’ from things, as Isidore put it.37 In explaining how 
God is inside things, the Summist continues a longstanding tradition, stemming at least 
from Pseudo-Dionysius, of affirming that God is in things by essence, power, and 
presence, citing Richard of St Victor and Anselm in favour of this opinion.38 While he is 
in things by essence insofar as he makes them to be what they are, he is in them by power 
                                                        
30 Augustine, De videndo Deo 9.21. 
31 SH, Tr 2, Qu 3, Tit 1, Cap 1, a, 62; cf. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa I.13: 
incircumscriptibile est quod nullo horum continetur.  
32 SH, Tr 2, Qu 3, Tit 1, Cap 2, Solutio, 63. 
33 SH, Tr 2, Qu 3, Tit 2, Cap 1, Solutio, pp. 64-5; cf. Augustine, Epist. 184, 4.11: 
sapientia replere sapientem. 
34 SH, Tr 2, Qu 3, Tit 2, Cap 1, Solutio, 64, quoting Boethius, De Trinitate 4: ‘Deus est 
ubique’ ita dici videtur non quod sit in omni loco, sed quod omnis locus ei adsit ad eum 
capiendum, cum ipse non capiatur in loco. 
35 SH, Tr 2, Qu 3, Tit 2, Cap 1, III.a, 64. 
36 Peter Lombard also treats this topic in his Sentences, distinctions 36-7, which cover the 
presence of things in God and God in things. 
37 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 1, 70-1.  
38 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 2, I.a, b, c, p. 71; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial 
Hierarchy, ch. 11; Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate II, 23; Anselm, Monologion 13.  
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in terms of the abilities he gives them, and by presence, through their corresponding acts 
or operations.39  
Since God is in things in these three ways, it remains to be considered whether 
they exist in him in those three ways as well.40 On this score, the Summist contends that 
things are in God by presence, because they are in his knowledge, and by power, because 
they are in him as their cause. By essence, however, they are not in him, otherwise the 
divine essence would depend upon the essences of creatures, which are not the cause of 
God but instead depend on him as their cause.41 In this connection, creatures are said to 
participate in God, whose being does not depend on participation in another but which is 
derived from himself.42 While there is no variation in essence, power or presence on the 
part of God, there is variation on the part of creatures, insofar as they participate 
differently and sometimes unequally in God.43  
Whereas Richard’s discussion of divine immensity was simply part of an attempt 
to reason to the one God, this section on the ‘location’ as it were of God throws into relief 
the Franciscan motivation for prioritizing this concept. To do so was to lay absolute 
emphasis on the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of God, or to highlight his 
intimate relationship with creatures and their complete dependence on him, while 
preserving his own independence from them. Stated otherwise, it was to picture a God 
whose fundamental attribute pertains to the fact that he knows and makes himself 
known—and can therefore be found—in all things without by the same token being 
captured fully by any of them—much in the way that Francis of Assisi famously 
envisaged. 
This emphasis on the specific terms of God’s knowledge and knowableness is 
reinforced in the treatise on divine knowledge, where the Summist argues that God 
knows not only universals but also singulars or individuals, because he is the artificer of 
great and small things equally.44 By contrast, the Summist states, in a discussion that 
anticipates the later Franciscan distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition, 
that human beings can only know universals, because they must infer them from sense 
knowledge, which bespeaks the imperfection of human knowledge at the intellectual 
level by comparison to God’s.45 Although the wisdom of God is one, consequently, he in 
                                                        
39 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 2, 72-3. 
40 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 4, II, 74. 
41 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 4, II, Respondeo, 75-6.  
42 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 2, II.2, 72. 
43 SH, Tr 2, Tit 3, Memb 1, Ch 5, Solutio, 76. 
44 See Rega Wood’s article on Alexander’s discussion of the divine ideas in his Gloss on 
Lombard’s Sentences and Disputed Questions: ‘Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: 
Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus’, Franciscan Studies 53:7 (1997). 
See also, Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri 
Lombardi (Quaracchi 1951-7). 
45 SH, Tr 5, Sectio 1, Qu 1, Memb 3, Ch 6, Ad objecta 1, p. 256: hoc est ex imperfection 
intellectus nostril quod non potest intelligere singulare, non autem ex eius 
immaterialitate. Aliter tamen dicendum et verius quod intellectus humanus intelligit 
singularia; intellectus enim accipit speciem rei et intelligit rem ipsam…nota igitur quod 
 10 
fact possesses many ideas, indeed, an idea for each individual thing. These ideas are the 
same in substance as that wisdom but differ in their mode of existence. That is to say, 
they subsist in the mode of the thing known, namely, the mode of creatures, rather than 
that of the knower, namely God. As such, they can be multiplied without undermining the 
unity of God.46  
As the Summist contends, divine ideas are infinite, precisely because God is 
infinite.47 Since, however, his disposition to create is finite, God has many ideas that are 
not instantiated. Thus, the divine knowledge consists of ideas for things that do exist as 
well as for things that do not exist, just as an architect possesses ideas for things he could 
but does not create.48 In a section on the immensity of divine power, the Summist 
elaborates on the distinction between the ideas God chooses and does not choose to 
instantiate, through a discussion of God’s absolute versus his ordained power. In this 
regard, he differentiates between what can be done de jure (by permission) and de facto 
(in principle). While human beings are only able to act de jure—for example, they can 
disrespect authorities de facto without being able to do so de jure—there is no difference 
between what is possible de jure and de facto for God, because he is the one who 
determines what is possible and what is actual in the first place.  
On these grounds, the Summist concludes that the exercise of God’s power is not 
limited by any factor—including his own will or action. In this regard, he recognizes that 
some might argue that God’s power is limited, employing the following syllogism:  
 
1. At the initial moment of creation (A), God was either able to create all that 
is creatable or not.49  
2. If not, then his power is limited in creating.  
3. If so, then he is able to create everything creatable in A.  
4. But if God creates everything creatable in A, then he is not able to create 
anything after A, which implies that his power is limited by his initial 
action.  
 
In response to this argument, the Summist contends that the affirmation that ‘God 
makes everything creatable in A’ does not necessarily imply that he is not able to create 
anything after A. For he only exhausts what he is able to do in the case of A, and even 
that limit is not essential to his nature but to the boundaries of A itself. After insisting that 
God’s action does not limit his immense power, the Summist goes on to make the more 
extraordinary claim that God’s power is not limited even by his own justice, goodness or 
wisdom. While God evidently does all things justly, because that is who he is, he is not 
unable to do anything unless it is just, because to attribute this inability to him would be 
to limit him.50 One theologically surprising implication of this claim is that God is in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
intellectus humanus intelligit singular per speciem vel similitudinem eius acceptam 
adminiculo sensus.  
46 SH, Tr 5, Sectio 1, Qu 1, Memb 4, Ch 1, II, Respondeo, 258. 
47 SH, Tr 5, Sectio 1, Qu 1, Memb 3, Ch 2, Respondeo, 252. 
48 SH, Tr 5, Sectio 1, Qu 1, Memb 3, Ch 1, Respondeo, 250-1. 
49 SH, Tr 4, Qu 2, Memb 2, Cap 1, I.1, 218. 
50 SH, Tr 4, Qu 2, Memb 2, Cap 2, Ad objecta I.1-3, 220.  
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principle able by his absolute power, or de facto, to damn those who are good and save 
those who are wicked. Although he declines to do this by his ordained power, or de jure, 
he does not derogate his power in doing so. Rather, he illustrates the immutability of his 
ordained power which functions in keeping with the justice of his will.51 
This excursus on the immensity of the divine power aside, the Summist affirms 
that the wisdom of God—and by implication, his ideas—are the same as his essence. 
From this, it follows that the instantiations of ideas in creation are in the divine essence. 
That is not to say that they are the divine essence, as if creatures comprised God, and he 
depended upon them for his existence, as in a sort of pantheism.52 As I have conveyed, 
this essence, that is, the Being of God, is first and foremost immense or infinite. In 
knowing himself as such, he knows all finite beings that could or do exist. Incidentally, 
this includes evil on some level, and to explain how so, the Summist distinguishes 
between simple knowledge and a form of knowledge that entails approval.  
While God does not know evil in the second way, he does know it in the first.53 
Though he is not the cause of evil, therefore, he allows it by giving human beings the 
freedom to choose or reject what is good. In doing so, he makes it possible for evil to be 
made good, not without qualification or simpliciter, but by reason of that which human 
beings elicit from evil circumstances.54 While evil is not good, useful, or expedient in 
itself, consequently, it can become good when it is ordered towards a good end by a 
human will that is conformed to the will of God, who makes all things good.55 
For this purpose, God further provides human beings with recourse to knowing 
him—and to knowing beings as they exist most truly in him—by implanting in them an 
innate knowledge of his immense Being. 56 Though this knowledge does not afford the 
                                                        
51 SH, Tr 4, Qu 2, Memb 2, Cap 2, Ad objecta III, 221. Another particularly interesting—
and related—section treats that which is possible for the divine power (SH, Tr 4, Qu 3, p. 
229ff.). In discussing this matter, the Summist distinguishes between the usage of the 
term ‘possible’ de dicto or de re. On his understanding, the de dicto application of the 
term does not apply here, because it refers to general categories of rather than specific 
beings or states of affairs. Possibility de re in his view can be defined either as proper or 
characteristic of a thing (proprie) or as appropriated by it (appropriate). What is 
appropriate is made possible by a superior cause, but what is proper is possible by its 
inferior or intrinsic cause. While it is not possible for a virgin to conceive and a blind 
person in terms of an inferior cause, it is possible by way of a superior cause (SH, Tr 4, 
Qu 3, Cap 1, Respondeo, p. 231.). Thus, such things are only possible unconditionally 
(simpliciter) where there is a superior cause. 
52 SH, Tr 5, Sectio 1, Qu 1, Memb 4, Ch 1, VI, Respondeo, 260. 
53 SH, Tr 5, Sectio 1, Qu 1, Memb 3, Ch 3, Respondeo 1, 253. 
54 SH, Tr 6, Qu 4, Ch 1, Respondeo, 403. 
55 SH, Tr 6, Qu 4, Ch 3, Respondeo, 404. 
56 SH, Tr 3, Qu 1, Memb 1, Caput 1, Respondeo, p. 113: ‘Ens’ sit primum intelligibile, 
eius intention apud intellectum est nota (Avicenna, Metaph. I.6); primae ergo 
determinationes entis sunt primae impressions apud intellectum: eae sunt unum, verum, 
bonum, sic patebit; non poterunt ergo habere aliqua priora specialiter ad sui 
notificationem. Si ergo notificatio fiat eorum, hoc non erit nisi per posterior, ut per 
abnegationem vel effectum consequentem.  
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full comprehension of the Infinite Being of God mentioned above, nor does it provide the 
actual content of his ideas about finite creatures, which must be derived from sense 
knowledge, it apparently supervises human efforts to abstract universal concepts from 
sense experience.  
In this way, the innate knowledge of the Infinite Being doubles as the knowledge 
of the First Truth whereby we may know the truth of all things as they correspond to an 
idea in the mind of God. By discerning this correspondence—what Bonaventure would 
later call ‘contuition’ (contuitio)—we simultaneously gain direct, albeit finite, insight into 
some aspect of the nature of God. We encounter him palpably. Of course, such 
knowledge is only accessible to those who have fulfilled the pre-condition for obtaining it.  
As the Summist makes clear in the very first and last sections of the volume on 
the doctrine of God, which respectively treat the nature of theology as a ‘practical 
science’, and the question of the will’s conformity to God, the orientation of the human 
will to the will of God, through piety or love for God, satisfies this pre-condition. It 
purifies the mind and thereby opens the door to the knowledge of Infinite Being whereby 
all finite beings can truly be known—and whereby God himself can be known through 
these beings to the extent that he currently can be.  
When laid out along these lines, the Franciscan reasons for adopting the doctrine 
of divine immensity—not to mention the notion of an innate human knowledge of Being, 
which is clearly derived from Avicenna—can hardly be ignored.57 As I have noted 
already, these thinkers were endeavoring, first and foremost, to lay down a distinctly 
Franciscan tradition of thinking theologically. Since the authorship of the Summa began 
only a decade after Francis of Assisi’s death, they were doing so very much under the 
inspiration of his example and vision for his order, which must therefore be consulted for 
the sake of interpreting where their allegiances to authorities actually lie.  
In perusing the biographies of Francis that were circulated around this time, 
which Thomas of Celano had been commissioned by the order to compose, not to 
mention Francis’ own writings—most famously the Canticle of Brother Sun—what we 
find is in some respects the Francis that we all know: a man with a profound sense of the 
love of God that is poured out in creating and sustaining beings of all shapes and sizes—
beings that reflect his love in turn. Coupled with this is a deep feeling of responsibility to 
care for all creatures as individuals, regardless of their status, after the manner of the 
divine. On this theme, Celano recounts the famous legends in which Francis kisses a 
leper;58 calls both inanimate and animate creatures by the name of ‘brother’ or ‘sister’;59 
and even preaches to an attentive flock of birds.60  
As Celano writes in more general terms, Francis saw in every work of the divine 
artist a reason to 
 
                                                        
57 See Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West (London: The 
Warburg Institute, 2001).  
58 Celano 2, in St Francis of Assisi: Omnibus of Sources, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Marion A. 
Habig, Paul J. Oligny, Leo Sherley-Price (Cincinnati: St Anthony Messenger Press, 
2008), 369. 
59 Celano 1, in ibid., 296. 
60 Celano 1, 277. 
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Praise the Artist; whatever he found in the things made, he referred to the Maker. 
He rejoiced in all the works of the hands of the Lord and saw behind things 
pleasant to behold their life-giving reason and cause. In beautiful things he saw 
Beauty itself. All things were to him good. ‘He who made us is the best’ they 
cried out to him. Through his footprints impressed upon things, he followed the 
Beloved everywhere. He made for himself from all things a ladder by which to 
come even to his throne.61 
 
In light of this brief excursus onthe early understanding of Francis, we can infer 
that the doctrine of divine immensity gave first-generation Franciscans a perfect resource 
for capturing the nature of the God as Francis envisaged it, and indeed for capturing 
Francis’ vision as to what it meant to imitate the life of the Son of God on earth. While it 
achieved its ends within the context of the Franciscan order, I would like to turn now to 
the last part of my discussion concerning the theological function it might perform for 
contemporary theology.  
 
Towards a Middle Way Between Classical Theism and Panentheism  
 
In this context, many readers will be aware, there is an ongoing debate between 
two main schools of thought regarding the general nature of God. While there is 
considerable room for ideological variation within these schools, they are normally 
categorized broadly in terms of Classical Theism or Panentheism. Classical Theism is 
usually traced to the likes of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, and indeed to the doctrine 
of divine simplicity. Although Panentheism has a long history in Hinduism and other 
religious traditions, it was popularized in the West largely as an offshoot of the so-called 
‘Process Theology’, which was introduced in the twentieth century by Alfred North 
Whitehead.62 The main thrust of Panentheism is this: while God cannot be conflated with 
the world, as in pantheism, he does not differ from it in terms of his general nature, but 
only in the sense that he ultimately transcends or ‘prehends’ it by containing it and all 
that it entails.  
By this account, God is subject to change, evil, suffering, materiality, and all the 
other features of finite, creaturely existence. These are the very features that Classical 
Theists abhor in discussions of God, who must on their account be completely immutable, 
impassible, spiritual, and good, precisely because he is a simple being who always 
completely is what he is, which is all that is good. For many Panentheist Christian 
theologians, the motivation for offering an alternative to this construal of God is to affirm 
his radically immanent nature and his intimate involvement in his creation—something 
they believe is sorely lacking in the Classical account’s emphasis on God’s transcendence.  
For many Panentheists, in fact, the Classical emphases on divine immutability and 
impassibility portray a detached and unfeeling God who cannot possibly empathize with 
                                                        
61 Celano 2, 494-5. 
62 As an anonymous reader of this article helpfully pointed out, however, Whitehead’s 
metaphysics is not the only means by which Christian theology has been introduced to 
Panentheism. See for example, Sergius Bulgakov in his Lamb of God (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdman’s, 2008).  
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or show compassion for his creatures. Arguably, this objection to Classical Theism can 
be evaded by offering a more sophisticated exposition of the doctrine of divine simplicity, 
such as one finds in the work of Thomas Weinandy and David Burrell.63 Such scholars 
point out in different ways that the doctrines of divine immutability and impassibility 
were introduced to reinforce God’s fidelity to his own nature, which is ultimately Love. 
In their view, a God who is subject to change—and thus to changing his mind, not least 
as a result of changing feelings, or passibility—would be a God who might prove fickle 
when it comes to extending compassion to his creatures. This is an implication of the 
classical doctrine—and its rejection—that Panentheists have seemingly overlooked. 
Furthermore, it seems to defeat the purpose of Panentheism, which is to affirm God’s 
ability constantly and compassionately to identify with his creatures.  
Be that as it may, the terms on which Aquinas affirms God’s immanence, 
compassion, and so on, are clearly not as self-evident to contemporary scholars as they 
are in the case of Panentheism. It takes a good deal of sophisticated theological 
maneuvering to see how he achieves similar ends to Panentheism by different means. 
While that maneuvering may be worth the while, there is a much more straightforward 
intermediary solution, which does not resort like most versions of Panentheism to 
reducing God to his immanence in the effort to illustrate it. This solution, I submit, can 
be found in the doctrine of divine immensity.  
According to this doctrine, God is radically other and wholly independent from 
his creatures, precisely because of his immensity or infinity. There is no sense, as in 
Panentheism, in which a certain ‘pole’ of his being might entail the qualities of finite 
creatures. While he manifests his nature in them, they do not conversely constitute his 
nature. On this showing, consequently, the transcendence of God is upheld in the 
strongest possible terms. At the same time, however, God individually knows and 
expresses himself in every single creature; he is present to each one of them, and makes 
his presence palpable through them in turn.  
This is the sort of account that many panentheists have been seeking, namely, one 
which adequately accounts for God’s involvement in his creation. Thus, it is one that I 
suggest holds promise for finding middle way between Classical Theism and 
Panentheism. Although early Franciscans were not aware of the debate between 
proponents of these positions when they developed this doctrine, they provided a 
resource for resolving them nonetheless, through the simple effort to systematise the 
thinking of the ‘little poor man’ whose legendary experience of God and compassion for 
creatures served as their overwhelming source of inspiration. 
 
                                                        
63 David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (London: University of Scranton Press, 2008); 
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